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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of the optimal equity capital requirements for banks 
from a society's perspective. In a previous paper about the impact of higher equity capital 
requirements on the Swiss economy, we had limited ourselves to a comparison of the social costs 
and benefits and concluded that the long-run benefits exceed long-run costs by a substantial 
multiple.1 In this paper we present an attempt to determine the optimal leverage and capital ratios 
for Switzerland's global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).  
This is desirable for a number of reasons.  
First, the economic debate about the appropriate minimum level of regulatory capital requirements 
for banks from a society's perspective is an open question. On the one end Admati and Hellwig 
(2013, p. 179) argue that there are no social costs associated with higher equity capital requirements 
and propose a leverage ratio requiring equity capital on the order of 20 to 30 percent of total assets. 
On the other hand, banking industry representatives continue to emphasize that in particular higher 
equity capital requirements reduce the availability of credit and retard economic growth.2 The 
conflict over the minimum appropriate level of banking capital blocked the finalisation of Basel III at 
the beginning of 2017. Some members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
emphasized that only strongly capitalized and highly liquid banks can support economic growth, 
while others argued that the pendulum of the Basel III revisions had already swung too wide and 
undermined the economic recovery.3   
Second, in October 2015, Switzerland amended its Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) legislation and decided to 
raise the required going concern leverage ratio for Switzerland's G-SIBs − Credit Suisse and UBS − to 
5 percent.4 This decision was based on the recommendation of the "Group of Experts on the Further 
Development of the Financial Market Strategy in Switzerland" that Switzerland should be among the 
countries with the most stringent capital requirements.5 Designing Swiss capital requirements along 
the same lines as foreign standards is one choice as well as the orientation on international 
competitiveness.6 As relevant as they are these considerations should be complementary in nature. 
However, they do not address the key question of whether the new TBTF capital requirements are 
appropriate from a society's point of view. An optimal level of bank equity capital should be 
determined by some aggregate welfare objective, taking into account that higher equity capital 
requirements benefit the economy by reducing the likelihood of banking crises while simultaneously 
imposing economic cost in terms of a lower potential economic output.  
Third, the debate about the social cost and benefit of higher capital requirements can only be settled 
by empirical analysis. In comparison to our 2013 paper, we can now utilize an extended database 
                                                                
1 Junge and Kugler (2013). 
2 See for example the comments of Sergio Ermotti, UBS CEO, in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (January 7, 2017). 
3 See for example the speech of Stefan Ingves (2017), Chairman of the Basel Committee and Governor of 
Sveriges Riksbank.    
4FINMA (Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA) 2015.  
5 Group of Experts, Report (2014).  
6 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (2016).  
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mainly in three areas: (i) Updated time series to estimate the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) effect 
including a period with a sharp reduction in leverage after the financial crises and allowing us to 
check the robustness of our earlier estimates. (ii) Use of a Translog production function with a time-
varying elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which is estimated with a completely 
revised and updated data series for the Swiss capital stock. This corrects for a weakness of our 2013 
cost of capital calculation, where we used a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
function with an elasticity of substitution estimate close to 1. The latter appears rather high, as both 
economic theory and empirical results for other advanced countries suggest a value which is clearly 
below 1 and around 0.5.  (iii) New capital quality conversion factors: An overlap of reporting dates 
between published capital requirements of CS and UBS under both Pre-Basel III and new Basel III 
definitions allowed us to determine conversion factors for a common reporting period. When we 
wrote our 2013 paper this information was not available.  
Based on this improved data situation, we extend our previous paper and seek to determine the 
optimal leverage and capital ratios for the Swiss G-SIBs.   
Switzerland's domestically systemically important banks (D-SIBs) do not come within the scope of our 
examination because these banks are not publicly traded on the Swiss stock exchange and therefore 
cannot be included in the methodological approach pursued in this paper.7  
The Swiss TBTF legislation stipulates that TBTF banks must fulfil minimum requirements for two 
different types of loss-absorbing bank capital: equity capital to absorb current operating losses in 
order to reduce the likelihood of G-SIBs failing (going concern capital) and equity-like capital to fund 
an orderly resolution in order to reduce the impact of failing (gone concern capital).8 In our 
examination, we focus on the level of going concern equity capital for the Swiss G-SIBs, taking as a 
given the gone concern capital requirements. Going concern capital is composed of Common Equity 
Tier1 (CET1 capital) plus Additional Tier1 capital (AT1). CET1 refers to loss absorbing equity of the 
highest quality and AT1 must meet the requirement to absorb losses, either through a write-down or 
conversion into ordinary shares. So the definitions of CET1 and Basel III Tier1 capital provide the 
appropriate regulatory basis to determine optimal equity capital requirements in terms leverage and 
capital ratios.   
There are good reasons for a strict separation between the cost-benefit analysis of going concern and 
gone concern capital requirements. First at all, the costs of gone concern capital for failed banks 
must be compared to the benefits of orderly resolutions and, by definition, cannot be subsumed 
under a specification of social benefits resulting from a reduced likelihood and severity of bank 
crises. Second, the quality and cost of capital also differ between going and gone concern capital. 
Going concern capital is a tested loss absorber. The greater the cushion of CET1 and AT1, the more 
losses a bank can withstand while remaining financially viable. In contrast, gone concern capital can 
be composed of lower capital qualities. It can include Tier2 capital, senior subordinated debt and 
                                                                
7 The three Swiss D-SIBs are Raiffeisen Gruppe, Zürcher Kantonalbank and PostFinance. The Swiss TBTF 
legislation requires that D-SIBs have to meet a lower minimum going concern leverage ratio of 4.5 percent. It is 
interesting that, in contrast to Credit Suisse and UBS, the three Swiss D-SIBs have comfortable levels of capital.   
8 See Financial Stability Board (FSB,2014) for an explanation of the need gone concern bank capital in addition 
to going concern bank capital. 
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bail-in-able debt, in short capital instruments that are less certain loss absorbers. Thus, it is essential 
to investigate separately the social costs and benefits for going concern and gone concern capital.9  
Our article is arranged as follows. In section 2 we present the M-M proposition of capital structure 
irrelevance for banks, review the existing evidence and re-estimate the size of the M-M effect for 
Switzerland’s G-SIBs using an extended sample period. In section 3 we investigate the implications of 
the M-M effects and calculate the banks' overall cost of funds and the social cost of higher equity 
capital requirements using the Translog framework. In section 4 we recapitulate the estimates of our 
2013 paper for social benefits and derive a social benefit curve for additional equity capital 
requirements. In section 5 we compare the social cost and benefit associated with higher equity 
capital requirements and determine optimal leverage and capital ratios under different capital 
definitions. Finally, section 6 concludes.   
 
2. The M-M framework of capital structure irrelevance   
2.1 Empirical Evidence of the M-M effect  
As shown by Modigliani-Miller, a company’s overall cost of funds is unaffected by the mix of equity 
and debt under perfect capital markets and in the absence of taxes and subsidies. An increase in equity 
will simply lower its risk and consequently the required return on equity. Higher equity or less leverage 
also makes the bank’s debt safer and implies less financial risk for debt. Ultimately a new equilibrium 
is established with lower required rates of return on equity and debt, a new mix of more equity and 
less debt and unaffected overall funding costs.10 The translation of this mechanism into a testable 
econometric framework for banks was first explored by Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010) as well as 
Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2011) and was applied to Swiss data by Junge and Kugler (2013). The 
framework is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAMP) and the M-M theorem. By assuming 
that the risk of bank debt is zero the following linear relationship between equity risk and leverage is 
obtained:11 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  =  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸                                                                                                                                   (1)    
where equityβ is the equity risk of the banks, assetβ  is the risk on the banks assets and   
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸
   is banks' 
leverage (L) with its equity (E) and debt (D) components. 
 According to equation 1 a reduction in leverage (i.e. an increase in equity) leads to a proportional 
decline of equity risk. For example, assume a bank that initially has a leverage of 40 and an equity 
market beta of 2. If equity is doubled, and hence leverage is halved to 20, equity beta declines from 2 
to 1.  
                                                                
9 A first analysis of the social costs and benefits for gone concern capital was presented by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB, 2015). These estimates suggest that the costs of gone concern capital are very small. 
10 As a numerical example assume a bank with a CHF 100 balance sheet financed by CHF 97 in debt and CHF 3 in 
equity. The return on debt is assumed to be 5% and the return on equity 25%. The overall costs of capital 
WACC are: 5.6% = [(5%*0.97) + (25%*0.03)]. If the bank decides to reduce debt to CHF 95 and raise equity to 
CHF 5, the bank is less risky than before. Under full M-M validity the required rate on equity will drop from 25% 
to 21.75% and the required return on debt from 5% to 4.75%. WACC however remains unchanged at 5.6% = 
[(4.75%*0.95) + (21.75%*0.05)]. 
11 See in particular Miles et al (2011) for a presentation of the theoretical basis of equation (1).  
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As pointed out in a recent study by Clark, Jones and Malmquist (2015),12 equation 1 is an appropriate 
specification for TBTF banks that benefit from implicit government guarantees and from deposit 
insurance in general. In this situation, the market perceives the debt of TBTF banks as risk-free and the 
adjustment to changes in leverage will be channelled through equity as stated in equation 1. In 
contrast, for smaller, non-TBTF banks the debt mechanism for adjustment cannot be ignored and the 
present framework is less appropriate.  
Equation (1) can be tested directly by running a regression of 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 on leverage and testing the 
hypothesis that the intercept is equal to zero if we have a full M-M effect.  Alternatively, we can 
generalize (1) by considering the log-linear model 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 Lc and test the full M-M hypothesis 
that c is equal to 1. The intercept term of this regression is now log(𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) and should have a negative 
sign. 
The linear variants of equation 1 can be empirically tested in two steps using the general Swiss 
Performance Index: 
1. The estimation of quarterly equity beta as defined within the CAPM 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜖𝜖𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛                                                                                                       (2) 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑 
              ∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼) 
                𝜖𝜖𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 
2.  A regression of the form 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒 = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒  + 𝜗𝜗𝑒𝑒 + 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒  +  𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒                                                                                                   (3) 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝛽𝛽 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠 
            𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒 = 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠 
              𝜗𝜗𝑒𝑒 = 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
              𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒 = 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 specific effect 
            𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 
So far, there are only a few empirical studies available that investigate the significance and size of the 
M-M effect. Kashyap et al (2010) and Miles et al (2011) show the existence of sizeable M-M effects 
for both the USA and the UK. Similar results are presented by ECB (2011)13 for a sample of 54 large 
international banks, by Junge and Kugler (2013) for Switzerland and recently by Clark et al (2015) for 
the USA. Table 1 provides an overview of the estimated sizes of the M-M effect from different 
empirical studies which report their findings differently. In Table (1) we present various ways to 
compare the estimated M-M effects.  
                                                                
12 These authors point out that equation 1 is a variant of the Hamada framework. See Hamada, R. S. (1969).   
13 ECB (2011).  
6 
 
 
Table 1: Gauging of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) offset   
 
 
Switzerland 
(Bernardi,  
2015)
Kashyab
 et al (2010) 
Clark
et al (2015)
 TBTF banks, 
Other banks 
TBTF banks Swiss IRB 
banks
 (CS, UBS and 
BCV)
M-M Offset based on regression analysis
linear vers. 1
1995-2011
linear vers. 2
1995-2011
linear
1976-2008
linear
1996-2012
linear
1997-2010
log linear
1997-2010
log linear
1999-2010
log linear
1999-2010
linear
1999-2014
(i) Estimated elasticity of beta with respect to leverage 69.2% 76.3% 54.5%
(ii) Change in observed beta given a 100% increase in equity (halving 
in leverage) as a percentage of a change in beta under full M-M 
validity  40.9% 71.8% 70.5% 71.0%
(iii) M-M effect derived from changes in WACC assuming a 100% 
increase in equity (halving in leverage). 100.0% 45.7% 9.1%
(a) Estimated coefficient: 
linear regressions of Leverage Ratio or Leverage -0.045 -0.079 -0.0453 0.031 0.07
(b) Median (average) Leverage Ratio 5.00                  5.00                 7.00                  
(c) Median (average) Leverage 30 30
45 (TBTF)
14 (Other 
banks) 45
(d) Median (average) Beta 1.1 1.1 0.90                  1.3 1.3
1.4 (TBTF)
0.3 (Other 
banks) 1.4
Lines (i) to (iii) report our calculation of the M-M effect based on the information provided by the authors of each study.
Lines (a) to (e) report the data provided by the authors of each study.  
Empty cells indicate “no data available” or not meaningful.
Data Inputs
54 largest global banks
USA UK
Switzerland 
(Junge, Kugler, 2013)
ECB 
(Dec. 2011)
Miles et al (2011) 
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The estimated coefficients of the log-linear regressions are a direct measure of the M-M effects. With 
100 percent M-M validity the elasticity of beta with respect to leverage is 1. Miles et al (2011) for the 
UK and Junge and Kugler (2013) for Switzerland report statistically highly significant and quite large 
direct elasticity estimates implying M-M offset in a range between 55 and 76 percent (see line (i) of 
Table 1). 
Second, in cases of linear regressions, the estimated coefficients cannot be compared easily across 
alternative studies (line (a), Table 1). However, if the median (average) values of the bank equity 
betas and the bank leverage are reported as shown in lines (b) and (c), we can gauge the size of the 
M-M offset. This is shown in lines (ii) and (iii) of Table 1. In line (ii) we calculate the observed change 
in beta as a percentage of the change in beta assuming full M-M validity.14 The linear regressions for 
both US and UK banks imply sizeable M-M offsets of 71 percent. Also the ECB-estimates for 54 large 
international banks suggest a range of M-M offsets between 41 and 72 percent. It is interesting to 
note that all these samples are typically composed of the larger, domestic or global systemically 
important banks.15        
Finally, a third alternative for measuring the size of the M-M offset is offered by comparisons of 
estimated WACC-changes with a WACC-change under full M-M validity. Miles et al (2011), Junge and 
Kugler (2013), Clark et al (2015) and a UBS-supported study by Bernardi et al (2015) provide WACC-
based results that can be used in this comparison. The M-M effects are summarized in line (iii). Again, 
the effects are sizeable for the UK (46 percent) and USA (100 Percent).16 Further comparison of Clark 
et al (2015) with banks of different asset-size classes shows that the M-M effect is smaller for non-
TBTF banks. The conclusions from their analysis are: First, the M-M theorem finds the strongest 
support among the US TBTF banks where implicit government guarantees are most material. Second, 
failure to differentiate by asset size leads to underestimation of the M-M effect.  
In sharp contrast to all other empirical studies Bernardi et al (2015) find a very weak M-M effect, as 
low as 9 percent, for a range of larger and smaller Swiss banks.17 In the light of the analysis of Clark et 
                                                                
14 The ECB uses this measure in order to allow a comparison of the estimated coefficients with the full M-M 
proposition. A full M-M impact implies that when the equity doubles (or leverage is halved), the beta should 
decline by half. In the case of the ECB findings, the average leverage ratio of the banks is 5% and the average 
beta 1.1 [see Table 1, lines (b) and (c)]. Hence, if the leverage ratio doubles to 10%, the beta should fall to 0.55. 
Table 1, line (a), shows that the coefficient of the leverage ratio is -0.045. A doubling of the leverage ratio 
implies that the beta will fall by -0.225 to 0.875 (since 0.045*5 = 0.225). Under full M-M validity betas would 
fall by 0.55, which implies an M-M effect of 41% (=0.225/0.55). See ECB (2011), p. 129.  
15 The US sample is composed of large banks with greater than 10 bn. in assets in 2008Q4 USD, see Kashyap et 
al (2010), Table 1. The UK sample includes Lloyds Banking Group, RBS, Barclays, HSBC, Bank of Scotland and 
Halifax, see Miles et al (2011).   
16  Clark et al (2015) estimate an intercept statistically not significantly different from zero, which implies an M-
M offset of 100 percent.   
17 The estimations of Bernardi et al (2015) consist of two steps. First, they estimate the increase in capital 
requirements for the Swiss banking system in general and the IRB banks in particular resulting from the BCBS 
plan to revise the Standardized Approach to bank capital for credit risk and to employ the revised Standardized 
Approach as a floor for bank capital based on the IRB approach. Second, they estimate the effect of these 
higher capital requirements on the WACC-based spreads for two scenarios: (i) a no M-M effect scenario or 
constant equity returns versus (ii) a scenario with the cost of equity reduced by the M-M effect. The no M-M 
effect scenario yields a spread impact of 33 bps while the scenario with M-M effect yields 30 bps (see Bernardi 
et al (2015) Table 21, line 5). Clearly, the difference between 33 bps and 30 bps is very small. Nevertheless, in 
order to put this result in perspective with other WACC-based empirical findings, we gauged the effect as 
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al (2015) and from our own experience the Bernardi et al (2015) results seem to suffer from a failure 
to adequately stratify the sample of banks by asset size.    
The empirical relevance of the M-M offset presented in Table 1 can be summarized as follows. First, 
with the exception of one study, the evidence clearly suggests that the M-M offset is sizeable, i.e. in 
the range of 40 to 70 percent, and even 100 percent for the US TBTF banks. Second, strong M-M 
offsets are typical for G-SIBs and D-SIBs because for these banks the assumption of zero debt beta is 
more appropriate than for smaller banks. Third, and not surprising, the M-M offset varies across 
different countries, different banking systems and different economic and institutional conditions. 
 
2.2 The M-M effect revisited for the Swiss G-SIBs 
In our 2013 study we employed quarterly data from 1999 and 2010 and estimated an M-M offset of 
55 percent (log-linear) for the two Swiss G-SIBs.  Much has happened since 2010. In response to the 
Swiss TBTF legislation both banks more than doubled their common equity (CET1) levels. In mid-2015 
Credit Suisse reported a CET1 ratio of 10.3 percent of RWA and UBS a ratio of 14.4 percent which can 
be compared to a benchmark of 4.5 percent of RWA at the end of 2010.18 In addition both banks 
enhanced their liquidity ratios and are in the process to implement the TBTF resolution 
requirements. Although all these measures enhanced the crisis resilience of the two banks, they 
should not reduce the size of the M-M offset.  
Table 2 reports the results of linear and log-linear regressions of equity beta on lagged bank leverage 
in line with equation 2. Lagged bank leverage is used as regressor in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems. The panel characteristic of the data is taken into account by fixed bank 
effects as well as a fixed or random time effect. The random time effect model is adopted in order to 
get an efficiency gain in estimation when the Hausman test shows no significant correlation of the 
regressor and the time effects. 
Table 2 shows the estimates for the full sample and a sample split in 2010. For the full sample we 
have to adopt the two way fixed effects model because bank as well as time effects are highly 
statistically significant and appear to be correlated with the residuals (according to the Hausman 
Test). 
The estimates of the log-linear model are highly statistically significant with a slope coefficient of 
0.534 which is very close to the value reported by Junge and Kugler (2013). As to the linear 
regression we notice a positive and significant intercept and a significant slope coefficient of 0.0175 
which implies an elasticity (M-M offset) of 0.46 evaluated at the means of beta and leverage.19 A 
significant intercept confirms the existence of a partial M-M effect. The estimates for the first sub-
period until 2010 are very close to those of the full sample. For the second sub-sample the slope 
                                                                
follows: Under the no-validity assumption of M-M, the required return on equity remains constant and WACC 
rises by 33 bps. In the second scenario WACC increases by 30 bps. Thus, the WACC impact is about 90% of the 
"no M-M" scenario (30/33=90.9%). Put differently, the M-M offset is about 10% as large as it would be if M-M 
held exactly. 
18 The definition of CET1 was introduced with the announcement of the Basel III framework at the end of 2010. 
A rough estimate of the CET1 capital ratio of the two Swiss G-SIBs can be derived from the Comprehensive 
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) of the BCBS, see BIS (December 16, 2010) and Junge and Kugler (2013), 
footnote 21.   
19 See footnote 17 above on calculation of the M-M offset. 
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coefficient is larger than the first sub-sample, namely 0.0292 implying an elasticity (M-M offset) of 
0.533 at the means, whereas the directly estimated log-linear elasticity is 0.649. The two sub-sample 
estimates are within one standard error of each other and we find, therefore, no sign of a structural 
break in the regressions. Note that we could use the random time effect specification in the second 
sub-period according to the Hausman test. Moreover, the sizably lower adjusted R-squared in the 
random effect model is to be expected, as the time dummy variables in the fixed effect model 
contribute to the R-squared whereas in the random effects model these effects are in the error term. 
 
Table 2: Bank equity beta and bank leverage   
 Linear Log-linear Linear Log-linear Linear Log-linear 
       
Frequency 
Time period 
Quarterly 
2001Q2- 
2015Q2 
Quarterly 
2001Q2-
2015Q2 
Quarterly 
2001Q2- 
2009Q4 
Quarterly 
2001Q2- 
2009Q4 
Quarterly 
2010Q2- 
2015Q2 
Quarterly 
2010Q2- 
2015Q2 
Bank effect 
F-statistics 
Fixed 
12.2225*** 
Fixed 
17.7367*** 
Fixed 
9.5651*** 
Fixed 
15.1629*** 
Fixed 
4.5103** 
Fixed 
4.9486** 
Time effect 
F-statistic 
Fixed 
5.7657*** 
Fixed 
5.7033*** 
Fixed 
5.5793 
Fixed 
15.1629*** 
Random 
- 
Random 
- 
a (constant)   
 
0.8269*** 
 (0.1605) 
-1.5512*** 
 (0.4225) 
0.6778*** 
 (0.2148) 
-1.7322*** 
 (0.5025) 
0.6753** 
(0.3093) 
-1.7731** 
(0.7218) 
b  0.01754** 
(0.003904) 
0.5340***  
(0.1157) 
0.01832***  
(0.00471) 
0.5551*** 
(0.1157) 
0.02920*** 
(0.01007) 
0.6487*** 
(0.2188) 
t-statistic H0: b=1          - 4.0277***          - 3.8543***    - 1.6056 
Adj. R-squared 0.7132 0.7132 0.7001 0.6903 0.1031 0.1437 
Hausman test - - -  2.4799 2.0465 
Mean Beta 1.54  1.57  1.49  
Mean Leverage 40.38  48.47  27.18  
Gauging the M-M 
Effect of the linear 
regression 
0.460  0.566  0.533  
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent level, respectively (null 
hypothesis for t-statistics: b=0, a=0). Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
 
In summary, the results of Table 2 not only confirm our earlier findings, they show that the M-M 
offset for the Swiss TBTF banks is robust across sub-periods and sizeable amounting to about 50 
percent of what is predicted under full M-M validity. This applies equally to the linear and the log-
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linear specification of the regression. Particularly important is the stability of the size of the M-M 
offset given the changes in regulatory and the economic conditions for the Swiss G-SIBs after 2010.  
 
3. Social cost of additional capital requirements  
3.1 Bank funding costs  
If the M-M offset is incomplete as in the case of the Swiss G-SIBs, higher capital requirements will 
increase the funding cost of banks. The banks will pass along the additional cost to borrowers and 
bank lending rates will rise. This in turn raises the economic costs of capital formation and leads 
ultimately to a permanent drop in GDP.  
In our model the banks' funding costs are the weighted average cost of capital, WACC. As we assume 
that debt has a zero beta, the cost of debt is equal to the risk-free rate 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓. Thus, we neutralize one 
channel through which the impact of higher capital requirements on funding cost works, and 
therefore tend to overestimate capital cost changes.  As discussed in section 2, however, the debt 
channel is not of crucial importance for G-SIBSs.  
Given these assumptions the the banks' weighted average cost, WACC, is:  
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅) = 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸𝐸 + 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓(1 − 𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸𝐸)                                                                                        (4)   
where 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 is the expected return on equity and 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 the risk-free rate.  
𝐸𝐸
𝐷𝐷+𝐸𝐸
  is the leverage ratio 
(LR). Since we estimated the size of the M-M effect as a function of leverage (rather than the 
leverage ratio), we rearrange equation (4) in terms of leverage. For this we replace  𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷
   by   1 
𝐿𝐿
  , 
where L stands for leverage.  
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 1𝐿𝐿 + 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 �1 − 1 𝐿𝐿  � =   𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 1𝐿𝐿 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 1 𝐿𝐿 +  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓                                                        (5)   
Next we apply the CAPM in order to include the results of our regressions between leverage and 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 in equation (5). The CAPM states that the required return on equity, 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , is proportional 
to the (bank specific) beta, 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , times the equity market risk premium, 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 .  
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 =  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + �𝑑𝑑� + 𝑏𝑏� 𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝                                                                                    (6)     
where 𝑑𝑑� is the constant and 𝑏𝑏� is the coefficient on leverage from our beta regressions (see Table 2).  
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) yields:     
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + �𝑑𝑑�𝐿𝐿 + 𝑏𝑏��𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝                                                                                                                        (7)    
Equation (7) shows that WACC is an inverse function of leverage and depends on the regression 
estimates 𝑑𝑑� and 𝑏𝑏� . These coefficients are based on Pre-Basel III definitions of leverage, i.e. of the 
ratio of Balance Sheet Assets to BIS Basel II Tier1 capital. In order to express WACC in terms of the 
definitions of the Basel III Accord, we need to convert the Pre-Basel III definition of leverage 
accordingly. Assuming that 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 is the conversion factor between the Pre-Basel III and the Basel III 
definition of leverage, equation (7) is adjusted as follows:   
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + � 𝑑𝑑�𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏��𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝                                                                                (8)    
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Equation (8) includes all elements to calculate the overall funding cost of the Swiss G-SIBs which can 
be rewritten in terms of the leverage ratio:    
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + �𝑑𝑑� ∙  𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 + 𝑏𝑏��𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝                                                                                 (9)  
Thus, WACC is a linear function of the leverage ratio. Since  𝑑𝑑� and 𝑏𝑏� are positive, higher capital 
requirements imply higher cost of capital. The conversion factor 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ensures that the leverage ratio 
is expressed in terms of Basel III Look-through (Fully applied) leverage ratio. Annex 1 explains in 
detail the different definitions of the leverage ratio and the derivation of the conversion factors.  
In the base case of the calculations developed below the parameters of the variables in the equations 
are as follows: 𝑑𝑑�̇  = 0.8269 and 𝑏𝑏� = 0.01754 are the estimated regression coefficients over the sample 
from 2001 and 2015.  The conversion factor 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 0.713 (=0.77/1.08, see Annex 1). As risk-free 
money market rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , we use the repo reference rate of the SNB, which was about 1 percent 
during this period. For the equity market risk premium, 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 , we assume a lower (5 percent) and an 
upper (10 percent) level to take account of the well-known fact that equity risk premiums vary 
greatly in size over time. All parameters and their values used in our analysis are summarized in the 
Tables of Annex 3. 
Table 3 shows the increase in WACC for the Swiss G-SIBs caused by a 1 percentage point increase in 
the leverage ratio. Two basic scenarios are compared: (i) the estimated M-M offset on WACC 
resulting from the linear regression 2001Q2 to 2015Q2 and (ii) the WACC impact under the 
assumption that the required return remains invariant to leverage, i.e. there is no M-M offset. 
Moreover, all calculations show the WACC before and after conversion to the final Basel III standards 
of post 1 January 2018. Thus, results are expressed in terms of the Basel III Tier1 Look-through (Fully-
applied) and CET1 Look-through (Fully-applied) definition of the leverage ratio.  
Table 3 confirms the observations already made in our 2013 paper:  
1. The M-M effect matters. Comparison of the WACCs calculated on the basis of the empirically 
observed M-M effect (left-hand side of Table 3) with those calculated under the assumption 
of no M-M validity (right hand section of Table 3) shows that the M-M effect reduces the 
WACC increase by 46 percent.   
2. Not surprisingly, the new more stringent capital requirements under Basel III imply 
systematically higher WACCs compared to Pre-Basel III levels. They are about 40 percent (for 
Tier1) respectively 80 percent (for CET1) higher than the corresponding pre-Basel III WACCs.   
3. Increases in the leverage ratio lead to proportional changes in WACC. A 1 percentage 
increase of the leverage ratio raises the Basel III Tier1-based (look-through) WACC by only 5.8 
bps (assuming an equity premium of 5 percent) and by 11.6 bps (assuming an equity 
premium of 10 percent). The corresponding WACCs for Basel III CET1 are higher amounting 
to 7.4 and 14.9 bps, respectively.   
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Table 3, Swiss G-SIBs: Impact on WACC resulting from a 1 percentage increase of the 
leverage ratio measured in bps. 
 
 
 
3.2 The responsiveness of GDP to the banks' cost of capital   
The starting point is the simple approach adopted by Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2011, 21-22), 
which is based on production function for GDP with capital (K) and labour (L) inputs and 
technological progress represented by a time trend Y=f(K,L,t). If factor prices are equal to marginal 
products, elasticity of production with respect to the price of capital can be written simply as a 
function of the substitution elasticity 𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒  and the elasticity of production with respect to capital 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 (equal to the income share of capital), whereby the subscript (t) reflects the possibility that the 
elasticity of production, 𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒  , with respect to the price of capital, 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 , as well as 𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒  and 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
can change over time: 
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒  𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 = − 𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 = −𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒                                                                                                       (10) 
Equation (10) is based on growth theory and therefore provides an estimate of the long-run impact 
of an increased price of capital on production. In line with the neoclassical growth theory a 
permanent increase in the price of capital leads to permanent change in the level of production but 
has no long-term effect on its growth rate, which is determined by labour supply growth and 
technical progress.   
If we adopt the CES production function the σ and SK are constant parameters. In our 2013 paper we 
followed this approach and estimated an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour for the 
real (nonfinancial) sector of approximately equal to 1, as in the special case of the Cobb Douglas 
production function. This is surprising given the estimates for other advanced countries which are 
usually clearly lower than one. Moreover, recently new statistics for Switzerland’s capital stock and 
the income distribution between capital and labour were published for the period 1995 to 2014, 
which provides an opportunity to check the case in a more flexible Translog framework. The Translog 
framework is based on a quadratic logarithmic approximation of the production function. This allows 
for a time varying rate of substitution and production weight of capital and includes the Cobb 
Douglas function as a special case20.  
                                                                
20 For an introduction to the estimation of Translog production function see Berndt (1991, Chapter 9). 
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The estimation of the Translog production function is reported in detail in Annex 2. It results in an 
elasticity of substitution varying between 0.42 and 0.44 during the period 1995-2014. Together with 
the time series of the capital cost share (𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒) and the elasticity of substitution (𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 ), we are able to 
calculate a time-varying estimate for the elasticity of production with respect to the price of capital 
as given in equation (10), i.e. 𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒  . This crucial parameter for our analysis varies between 0.34 to 
0.27 with a mean and median approximately equal to 0.31. Interestingly this parameter reached its 
absolute maximum before the financial crisis and decreases in absolute value since 2008, implying a 
weaker reaction of GDP to capital costs changes in recent years (see Annex 2, Figure 7) .  
The Translog production elasticity of 0.31 lies clearly below the estimate of 0.43 used in our 2013 
paper. However, compared to other advanced countries the production elasticity of 0.43 appears too 
high. Miles et al (2011) and Clark et al (2015) apply a production elasticity of 0.25 on the basis of 
empirical studies related to the UK and USA.21 The advantage of our new Translog estimate is that it 
is more plausible than the CES estimate and of the same order of magnitude as the UK and US 
estimates.        
As a next step, we need to determine the capital costs for the Swiss companies in line with the 
assumed market risk premiums of 5 percent and 10 percent. To this end we first estimate the equity 
beta of the Swiss non-financial companies, i.e. we run a similar regression as in equation 2 for the 
period 2001 to mid-2015, this time, however, with returns on the index of the Swiss corporate sector 
(excluding financial and insurance companies) as left-hand variable (𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ) and returns of the SPI 
as right-hand variable in addition to the intercept alpha:   
∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 ∙ ∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜖𝜖𝑒𝑒                                                                                                        (14)  
Not surprisingly the beta for Swiss non-financial companies, 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 turns out to be slightly above 1, 
namely 1.1. Next, we apply CAPM and calculate the capital costs for the Swiss non-financial 
companies P𝐾𝐾 under the same assumptions as we calculate the return on equity for the banks. Given 
the two risk premiums (5 percent and 10 percent), we determine a lower (6.5 percent) and an upper 
estimate (12 percent) of the capital cost for Swiss non-financial companies.  
As the Swiss TBTF legislation applies to the Swiss G-SIBs, only these institutions are under pressure to 
increase lending rates.22 Consequently economy-wide lending rates will increase only by a certain 
proportion, determined by the role of the G-SIBs in the transmission channel. Since in our approach 
the impacts of higher WACCs are channelled through the Swiss corporate sector, the relevant market 
share is the share of G-SIBs in external financing of the Swiss corporate sector. This share is 10.8 
percent.23  
                                                                
21 See in particular J. Smith (2008), Barnes et al (2008) and C.I. Jones (2003).  
22 In principle, the Swiss TBTF legislation applies to both the Swiss G-SIBs and the D-SIBs. However, currently 
the D-SIBs are out of scope, because details of their regulation are still open. Moreover, the Swiss D-SIBs are 
well capitalized.     
23 The share of the “all Swiss banks” in external financing of Swiss companies is 35% and has been stable for years 
(see Trend, M.I.S. (2013). The market share of the two Swiss G-SIBs in domestic lending is 31% (see: SNB, 
Bankenstatistisches Monatsheft, Kreditvolumenstatistik). Thus, the relevant G-SIBs' share in external financing 
of the Swiss corporate sector is 10.8% (=0.35*0.31).   
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Finally, we assume that any rise in WACC is passed on one-for-one by banks to their customers. This is 
a simple and transparent assumption avoiding a complex extension of the model.   
The above discussion can be summarized as GDP Multiplier (GDPM) in equation (15).     
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 =  𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + (𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 ∙ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝) =  𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒                                                                                        (15)   
Equation (15) states that the responsiveness of output depends on the share of external financing of 
the Swiss corporate sector by the G-SIBs, SEF, the elasticity of production with respect to the price of 
capital, 𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 ,  and the price of capital, 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒. For example, take an increase of WACC by 11.6 bps 
(see Table 3, Basel III Tier1). At a given SEF of 10.8 percent the cost of capital for the nonfinancial 
firms rises by 1.25 bps above its current cost 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒  of 1200 bps. This is an increase of 0.104 percent 
(1.25/1200 = 0.104%) and translates into a permanent fall in output of 3.2 bps given the elasticity 
𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒  of 0.31 (0.31*0.104% = 3.2 bps).  
Given equations (9) and (15) the GDP cost of higher leverage ratios, 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  are:  
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� = �𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + �𝑑𝑑� ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 + 𝑏𝑏�� ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� ∙  𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒                                  (16)       
After defining a base level of 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_0  as point of departure for the increases of the leverage 
ratio, 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , the equation can be further simplified.  
 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝  𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡∙𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡 �𝑎𝑎�∙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  − 𝑎𝑎�∙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_0𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �                                 (17)           
Equation (17) is a linear, upward-sloping function of the leverage ratio and measures the GDP cost of 
additional capital in comparison to a given base level of LR. We use this equation to calculate the 
GDP impact of higher capital requirements.    
For the base level for 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_0 here and for the GDP benefit curve developed in the next section 
we select 3.3 percent, which is approximately the mean value of the Basel III converted leverage ratio 
for Tier1 over the period 2013 to 2015. Inserting the already mentioned values of the parameters 
(see Annex 3, Tables A.3 and A3.2 for a detailed presentation of the parameters and their values) into 
equation (17) allows us to calculate the social economic cost resulting from a 1 percentage point 
increase in the leverage ratio. Table 4 presents the results.    
Table 4: Impact on real GDP resulting from a 1 percentage point increase in the Basel III leverage 
ratio 
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Perusal of the results in Table 4 reveals that the social economic costs related to higher capital 
requirements for the Swiss G-SIBs are very small. The estimates suggest permanent annual output 
losses of 0.03 percent of GDP for a 1 percentage point increase in the TBTF leverage ratio for Basel III 
Tier1 capital. For CET1: a 1 percentage point increase in the Basel III CET1 leverage ratio leads to a 
permanent fall in the level of real GDP by 0.04 percent. Using an annual discount rate of 5 percent, 
the estimates imply a fall in the present value of all future GDP in the range between 0.6 percent to 
0.8 percent.24 Thus, the recent decision of Switzerland to lift the TBTF Basel III Tier1 LR from 3.12 
percent to 5 percent implies a social economic cost of about 0.06 percent per annum whose present 
value is equal to 1 percent of current output. Note from Table 4 that the size of the market risk 
premium does not matter very much. It influences the economy as a whole (both the banking and 
the corporate sector simultaneously) leaving the relative cost between the banking and the 
corporate sector largely unaffected.25  
Finally, the last two columns of Table 4 report the social economic costs of higher capital 
requirements if there were no M-M offset. They are nearly twice as high than the results including 
the M-M effect, which once more emphasizes that the M-M effect matters.  
It is worthwhile to note that the above findings are consistent with a very different investigation. In a 
recent time series analysis Kugler and Junge (2016) estimate a vector autoregressive model and find 
little support for the view that higher capital requirements for banks imply widening credit spreads 
and lower real GDP growth. In line with our calculations here the vector autoregressions show that 
strengthening bank capital has no sizeable negative impact on Swiss GDP as one would expect it in 
the case of a sizeable M-M offset.   
 
4.  Social benefits of additional capital requirements 
The model used to evaluate social benefits of higher capital requirements is based on our earlier 
analysis (Junge/Kugler, 2013). First we estimated the permanent effect of banking crises on the 
growth path of GDP. Second, the dependence of the annual probability of banking crises on trend 
leverage of large banks was estimated. Finally, multiplying the probability function by the estimated 
permanent drop in the growth path of GDP provided the expected GDP loss as a function of trend 
leverage of large banks.  Short and medium term dynamics during the crisis were ignored. This is in 
line with our cost estimates discussed in the previous section taking into account only the long run 
effects of higher capital requirements.   
To estimate the impact of banking crises on economic output we used annual Swiss GDP data from 
1881 to 2010 and identified the major severe and long-lasting recessions since then. Switzerland 
experienced four fully fledged banking crises since 1881, namely in 1911, 1931, 1991 and 2007. In 
addition, we accounted for the two world wars (1917 and 1942) as well as the oil price shock of 1974.   
                                                                
24 We use the discount rate of 5 percent only in order to facilitate the comparison of our results with the results 
from other studies. In particular, the BCBS tends to present estimates of social economic cost using a discount 
rate of 5 percent. The appropriate social discount factor for Switzerland should be much lower. 
25 In equation (16) the market risk premium enters the numerator through the change in the banks' funding 
cost (equation 9) and the denominator through P𝐾𝐾 (equation 15) with little overall impact on real GDP growth. 
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In order to estimate the long run impact of these crises we used a deterministic time trend model for 
log GDP taking into account the effects of major shocks by including level shift dummy-variables 
(being equal to 0 before the event and 1 after) for all major adverse shocks. 
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The dummies did not capture the short-run effect of a crisis but only its permanent effects on GDP. 
The transitory cyclical deviations from trend were captured by the residual of equation (18), which 
we expect to be strongly auto-correlated but stationary. This assumption is confirmed by the 
corresponding econometric tests.  
The empirical results for this model and annual Swiss data from 1881-2010 are as follows: First of all, 
consider the coefficient estimate for the time trend 1γ : It is 0.039, which implied a potential GDP 
growth of nearly 4 percent instead of the historical average of 2.7 percent. This reduction of 
measured GDP growth was brought about by permanent shifts of the GDP growth path by the crises 
reflected in our dummy variables. The data enabled us to adopt a more restricted model assuming 
the same effects for all four banking crises and the three non-banking crises, respectively. This 
allowed us to get the estimated average impact of a banking and non-banking crisis. The estimates 
indicated that a severe banking crisis leads to a permanent and highly statistically significant 
decrease in the growth path of real GDP of 28.5 percent, whereas the other adverse shocks let “only” 
to an approximately 11 percent permanent reduction of GDP which was only marginally significant at 
the 10 percent level. The difference between these two estimates represented the additional 
negative GDP effect of a crisis with severe banking problems. This was -17.7 percent with a standard 
error around 6 percent. The value was therefore statistically significant at the 1 percent level.26  This 
estimate will be used in our calculations of the benefits of avoiding banking crises presented below. 
We should mention here that our approach to estimating the GDP loss of a banking crisis differs from 
that used by BCBS (2010) or more recently Cline (2016). These authors use a kind of event study 
approach and compare the actual GDP path with a hypothetical GDP path with no banking crisis: 
these differences are then discounted resulting in a measure for the overall (short and long run) GDP 
loss triggered by a banking crisis. The assumptions on the potential growth path are crucial in this 
framework. Is there a permanent effect of the crisis on GDP or is it a transitory phenomenon? Not 
surprisingly, the results depend strongly on the classification of the losses as permanent or 
transitory. By contrast, our approach does not consider the short run GDP loss but exclusively the 
permanent impact of a banking crisis on the growth path of GDP. At least for Switzerland this model, 
which passes all the relevant econometric tests, clearly tells us that we have a strong permanent 
impact of banking crises on the growth path of GDP.  
Having estimated the impact of banking crises on Swiss GDP we then considered the annual 
probability of the occurrence of a banking crisis and its relationship to leverage. To this end we 
estimated a probit model for the occurrence of banking crises in Switzerland with the explanatory 
                                                                
26 These observations are in line with the research of the IMF (2009) on recessions and Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoff’s (2009) investigations of banking-crisis recessions. Accordingly, recessions resulting from 
banking crises tend to differ from recessions generally. They are more severe and drawn out and according to 
C. Reinhard and K. Rogoff are “associated with profound declines in output and employment”  
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variables being leverage of the Swiss large banks, interest rate spread (mortgage/savings rate), real 
GDP growth and inflation.27 For this purpose we decomposed the first three variables into a 
transitory or cyclical and a permanent or trend component using the HP filter. Inflation was 
decomposed into an expected (using an AR(2) model to predict inflation) and an unexpected inflation 
rate (the residual of the AR(2) model). All regressors were lagged one year in order to avoid 
simultaneity problems. We have to mention that leverage is defined as total assets divided by total 
book equity. This approach was chosen for data reasons, since it was only for this definition of 
leverage that we had the long-time series we need for our analysis.  
For leverage and the interest rate spread only the cyclical component was statistically significant. An 
increase in cyclical leverage (interest rate spread) leads to an increase (decrease) in the probability of 
a banking crisis. The findings appear reasonable: A strong short-run increase in leverage and a cyclical 
decline in the interest rate spread are indicators for overexpansion, with fierce competition in the 
banking sector, and are typical of the euphoria paving the way to a bubble. The change in trend GDP 
(10 percent significance) and in expected inflation (5 percent significance) reduce the probability of a 
banking crisis. These results were in line with our a priori expectations. An increase in trend growth 
indicates that loans become less risky and the incomplete adjustment of bank (sight) deposit rates to 
inflation.   
The higher equity capital requirements under Basel III and the Swiss TBTF legislation do not primarily 
target the cyclical variability of the leverage but are designed to reduce leverage permanently, i. e., a 
reduction of the trend component is intended. Even if there is no direct significant effect of the trend 
component of leverage on the probability of a banking crisis there is an indirect impact resulting from 
the relationship between the variability of the cyclical component and the trend component of 
leverage. Indeed, the application of an EGARCH model provided a statistically highly significant effect 
of trend leverage on the variance of the cyclical leverage component.  
Figure 1 shows the probability of a banking crisis as function of the trend component of the leverage 
of large banks. This function was estimated as the mean of 50,000 Monte Carlo replications 
simulating the effect of the variability of the cyclical component of leverage on the probability of a 
banking crisis. That is, we calculated the conditional variance as a function of trend leverage ranging 
from 5 to 28 and used these values to create the 50,000 Monte Carlo replications for the cyclical 
component of leverage for all values of trend leverage. These values were then used to arrive at the 
probability according to the probit model described above. For these calculations, all other variables 
except leverage were kept at their long-run equilibrium level.   
This exercise showed, as expected, that reduced leverage (higher capital levels) is associated with 
lower probabilities of banking crises. Reducing the leverage from 28 to 14 leads to a decrease of 3.6 
percent28 in the annual probability of a crisis (see Figure 1 below). Note also that the slope between 
crisis probability and leverage declines with lower levels of leverage. At high levels of leverage (low 
levels of capital) reductions in leverage (increases in capital) yield larger decreases in the probability 
                                                                
27 The sample period runs from 1906 to 2010. 
28 The BIS (August 2010) survey shows that an increase of CET1 capital ratio by 100 percent (i.e. halving of 
leverage) leads to a reduction of the probability of banking crisis by 4.2 percent; see Table 3. The two estimates 
are not far from each other and one could expect that the crisis probability of Switzerland is lower than the 
experience of a panel of countries over a period of nearly 30 years (1980-2008).     
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of crisis than at low levels of leverage (high capital levels). This pattern is consistent with our 
expectations that the marginal benefits of higher capital levels decline with further capital increases.     
Figure 1: Estimated annual probability of banking crises and leverage of large banks 
 
 
The expected GDP benefits (in the sense of avoided costs of crises) were obtained by multiplying the 
probability of Figure 7 by 17.7 percent (the estimated GDP loss produced by a banking crisis) and 
displayed in Figure 2. For instance, a reduction of the leverage from 28 to 14 leads to a decrease in 
expected costs of banking crises by 0.64 percent of GDP. Note that this effect is permanent and that 
the discounted future GDP loss, at a discount rate of 5 percent (2.5 percent), is 13 percent (26 
percent).     
Figure 2: Expected annual GDP benefits and trend leverage of large banks. 
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For further analysis, we follow the approach of Cline (2016) and approximate the function displayed 
in Figure 2 by an exponential expression: 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 �𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� =  𝑊𝑊 ∙ (𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛  ∙   𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝜌𝜌                                      (19) 
This function provides a very close fit (R-squared = 0.998) to the data of Figure 2 and the exponent 𝜌𝜌  
is estimated as 2.54 and the constant A is 1.56E-04. The exponent describes the concave slope of the 
function and the constant A reflects the expected GDP loss when the leverage is zero, i.e. the 
asset/capital ratio is 1.29 Moreover, the function is now expressed in terms of the Basel III leverage. 
The conversion factor is 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 0.676 (= 0.73/1.08, see Annex 1 and Table A3.2 in Annex 3) and 
turns the accounting-based leverage multiple of balance sheet assets/book equity used in the 
estimation of the probability function into a Basel III compliant expression. 
This function is transformed in terms of the leverage ratio LR = 1/L: 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝑊𝑊 ∙ (𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ∙ 1𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝜌𝜌 = 𝑊𝑊 ∙ ( 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝜌𝜌         (20)             
The change in Expected benefits compared to a base leverage ratio 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_0 R is therefore given by 
the following equation: 
𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� =  𝑊𝑊 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝜌𝜌 ∙ � 1𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝜌𝜌 − 1𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_0𝜌𝜌 �                        (21) 
This function is displayed in Figure 3 where the starting value of the leverage ratio is set to 3.3 
percent, with the approximate mean value of the Basel III converted leverage ratio expressed in 
terms of Basel III Tier1 over the period 2013 to 2015.  
Figure 3: Change in expected annual GDP benefits and leverage ratio of large banks in percent.
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29 Ln (1) = 0, Note the constant A = 1.56E-04 refers to expected loss (crises probability * 17.7%).   
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A 1 percentage point increase of the leverage ratio from 3.3 percent to 4.3 percent yields a GDP 
benefit of 0.16 percent. This is clearly above the impact on GDP Cost of 0.03 percent (see Table 4) 
and in line with the conclusion of our 2013 paper that the benefits exceed long-run costs by a 
substantial multiple. However, after a certain level the marginal benefit of additional capital turns 
modest and falls short of marginal cost. For example, a 1 percentage point increase of the leverage 
ratio from 7 percent to 8 percent amounts to only 0.01 percent GDP benefit and hence is below GDP 
cost. This behavior stems directly from our estimation of the annual crisis probability and reflects the 
fact that extreme crisis events are rare and require significantly more capital.     
The sharply shaped benefit curve is an observation that has also been made in other studies. We 
have already mentioned Cline (2016). But also Miles (2012), another Bank of England study (2015) 
and a recent IMF paper (Dagher et al 2016) estimate similar shapes of benefit curves. The common 
feature is that the marginal benefits of additional capital are material at first, but rapidly turn modest 
after a certain level of bank capitalization.  
 
5. Comparing social cost and benefits and the determination of the optimal leverage ratio   
Using the Cost Line equation (17) and the Benefit Curve equation (21) we calculate the social 
marginal cost (MC) and benefit (MB) and determine the optimal leverage ratio for the Swiss G-SIBs. 
The optimal leverage ratio will occur where the two marginal effects are equal (MC=MB).     
The derivative of the social Cost Line equation (17) with respect to the required Basel III leverage 
ratio is: 
𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊 = 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑑𝑑�𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛                                                                                                                         (22)   
All terms in equation (22) are constants and hence the derivative with respect to the leverage ratio is 
a constant.  
The derivative of the benefit equation (21) is: 
𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 = 𝛾𝛾 ∙  𝑊𝑊 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝜌𝜌 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅−ρ−1                                                                                                                   (23)    
Equation (23) states that increases of the leverage ratio reduce the marginal benefit. The shape of 
the function is concave and reflects the diminishing benefit to increases in the leverage ratio.  
Solving for the optimal LR* yields:  
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅∗ = � 𝜌𝜌 ∙  𝑊𝑊 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝜌𝜌
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 ∙
𝑑𝑑�
𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
�
1
1+𝜌𝜌                                                                                                             (24)          
Table 5 reports the base case for the optimal LR* for Swiss G-SIBs in terms of the Basel III Tier1 and 
CET1 leverage ratios and Figure 4 provides an example of a graphical presentation. The base case 
varies with respect to two parameters: the capital definition (Basel III Tier1 or CET1) and the Risk 
Premium (5 percent or 10 percent).30  
 
                                                                
30 A complete list of the parameters and variants is shown in Annex 3, Table A3.1. 
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Table 5: Base case: Optimal TBTF leverage ratios for Swiss G-SIBs  
 
Optimum and minimum  
required LR  
Basel III Tier 1 Basel III CET1 
LR* (RP=5%) 6.07% 4.43% 
LR* (RP=10%) 5.93% 4.33% 
Minimum required LR 5.00% 3.50% 
 
 
Figure 4: Optimal Leverage Ratio LR*, Basel III Tier1. 
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The base case suggests that the optimal leverage ratio for Basel Tier 1 capital requirements is about 6 
percent and for CET1 capital requirements about 4.4 percent. Thus, the Swiss regulatory TBTF 
minimum leverage ratios fall short of the optimal level by about 1 percentage point. This result can 
be translated into risk-weighted capital ratios. Since the Swiss TBTF framework establishes a fixed 
linear relationship between the leverage ratio and the capital ratio for Swiss G-SIBs,31 capital ratios 
are easily calculated and compared to other studies of optimal capital ratios (see Table 6).   
 
                                                                
31 The link between the leverage ratio and the capital ratios for Swiss G-SIBs is the RWA density, which is the 
average risk weight per unit of exposure for any given bank (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷
) . In order to ensure a coherent interaction 
between the leverage and the capital ratios the Swiss TBTF framework requires for G-SIBs an RWA density of 35 
percent. Hence, capital ratio (CR) is easily determined from the leverage ratio and the RWA density: 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 . 
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Table 6: Optimal capital ratios and Minimum equity requirements  
Mainly large systemically important 
banks Source  Basel III Tier1 
Basel III 
CET1 
Optimal 
Capital Ratios 
Switzerland Junge/Kugler 17% 12.5% 
United Kingdom 
Miles et al (2011) 20%  
Bank of England (2015) 10-14%  
Sweden  
Sveriges Riksbank 
(2011)  14-17% 
Norway Norges Bank (2012)  16-23% 
Industrial countries 
BCBS (August 2010)   12.5% 
Dagher et al (2016, IMF)  15-23%  
Cline, W.R. (2016)  11.7-14.1% 
Minimum equity requirements 
Switzerland  14.3% 10.0% 
BCBS  9.5-11.0% 8.0-9.5% 
 
 
Going over Table 6 leads to three conclusions: First, the optimal capital ratios for Swiss G-SIBs are 
about 2.5 percentage points higher than the required Swiss TBTF capital ratios of 14.3 percent (Basel 
III Tier1) and 10 percent (CET1). Second, a similar picture emerges for the large banks of other 
countries. The optimal capital ratios are always above the minimum equity requirements of the 
BCBS. Third, results vary widely across the studies, which is not surprising given the uncertainty 
attached to the estimations and the differences in applied methods and assumptions. Key 
parameters with significant impacts on the optimal capital ratio are: the size of the M-M offset, the 
share of business finances by banks and the GDP loss experience of countries in banking crises.   
In order to assess the uncertainty attached to the estimations and the choice of parameters we 
follow a methodology of Cline (2016) and provide alternative parameter values for key variables and 
calculate optimal LRs* for all possible 324 combinations32 of the parameter values shown in Table 
A3.1. Figure 5 presents a histogram of the calculations. The lowest optimal LR* is 3.72 percent which 
is obtained by assuming a zero M-M offset (â =1), the higher risk premium (10 percent), a larger 
share of external financing of firms affected by capital cost increase (18.5 percent), a high elasticity of 
GDP with respect to capital costs (0.34), a lower GDP Loss severity (10 percent) and a downward 
adjusted exponent of the benefit curve (minus 2 standard errors). The median of the optimal LR* is 
5.69 percent which is above the minimum requirement and close to our benchmark case discussed 
above. The maximum LR* is equal to 8.75 percent which is accomplished by assuming an M-M offset 
of 67 percent (â =0.506), a low risk premium (5 percent), the base case share of non-financial 
corporates' financing provided by G-SIBs (10.8% percent), a low elasticity of GDP with respect to 
capital costs (0.27), a high GDP Loss severity (28.5 percent) and an adjusted exponent of the benefit 
curve (plus 2 standard errors). It is worth mentioning that the asymmetry of the frequency 
distribution is mainly driven by the M-M effect. The econometric estimate of the intercept (=â-2 
standard errors) corresponds to a 67 percent M-M offset. However, compared to the no M-M validity 
(â =1), a larger M-M offset than 67 percent may be justified. When we increase the M-M offset to 75 
                                                                
32 We have 4 parameters with three values and 2 with 2 resulting in 34 times 22 combinations. 
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or even 90 percent we get a high optimal leverage ratio of over 10 percent and the median increases 
to ca. 6 percent in the distribution for the outcome of all the parameter combinations. 
Figure 5: Histogram of Basel III Tier1 Optimal Leverage Ratio LR*.  
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Finally, the CET1 histogram exhibits a similar pattern as shown for Basel III Tier1 in Figure 3. Its 
median is equal to 4.13 percent, which is above the minimum TBTF standard of 3.5 percent and 
somewhat below the optimal base case LR*of 4.43 percent of the CET1 base case.  When we vary the 
parameter values we arrive at a minimum optimal CET1 leverage ratio of 2.72 and a maximum of 
6.39 percent, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper extends the analysis of Junge and Kugler (2013) on the effects of increased equity capital 
requirements on Swiss GDP in three respects. First, we present updated estimates of the M-M offset 
for Swiss G-SIBs extending the data base from 2001-2010 to 2001-2015. Second, we replace the CES 
production function applied for the estimation of the impact of capital costs on GDP by a flexible 
Translog form which was estimated using newly released capital stock data for Switzerland. Thirdly, 
we calculate the socially optimal leverage and capital ratios for the Swiss G-SIBs equating the 
marginal costs and marginal benefits of higher equity capital requirements. Our main results are: 
First the M-M effect is robust with respect to the substantial extension of the data base and yields an 
offset of capital cost of 46 percent. Second, the Translog production function estimate results in a 
time-varying elasticity of production with respect to the price of capital between 0.34 and 0.27, 
which is substantially lower than the value of 0.43 found in the CES framework. Third, and most 
important, the optimal leverage ratios for Swiss G-SIBs are approximately 6 percent in terms of Basel 
III Tier1 and 4.5 percent in terms of CET1. The corresponding optimal risk-weighted capital ratios 
range are 17 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Thus, our estimates of optimal leverage and 
capital ratios are about 20 percent higher than the recently revised minimum TBTF requirements for 
the Swiss G-SIBs.  
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The paper also addresses the large range of uncertainty around the estimates. Although variations in 
the key parameters can result in big changes in the estimated optimal capital requirements ranging 
from 3.7 to 8.8 percent, the median of the distribution is close to our benchmark estimate of 6.1 
percent.    
Our estimates of optimal equity requirements are considerably smaller than the Admati and Hellwig 
(2013) proposition of 20 to 30 percent. Their argument is based on the M-M theorem that higher 
equity capital requirements would not increase the banks` overall funding cost and hence do not 
impact GDP. They do not consider the impact of GDP benefits nor the intersection of marginal cost 
and benefits. In line with a partial M-M offset, our estimates show that the M-M theorem matters 
and that GDP costs are rather small as presumed by Admati and Hellwig (2013). But the limiting 
factor for additional increases in capital requirements stems mainly from the GDP benefit curve. Its 
shape implies that the marginal benefits of additional capital turn modest at leverage ratios clearly 
below 20-30 percent.       
Finally, given the uncertainty around our estimates, we are the first to caution against a too-literal 
interpretation of the "optimal" equity capital requirements. Rather, our investigation of the trade-off 
between social cost and social benefit of higher equity capital requirements should be taken as an 
important complementary alternative to other approaches to bank capital determination. At any 
rate, our investigation addresses the central question of the optimal level of bank equity capital. The 
issue, however, is far too complex to be treated by one approach alone. Instead, different 
approaches - including international benchmarking exercises and competitiveness considerations as 
applied by the Swiss Group of Experts -  should be used to determine the appropriate level of bank 
equity.     
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Annex 1: Regulatory capital definitions and conversion methods  
This Annex presents the various definitions of leverage ratios used to calculate the economic costs 
and benefits of higher equity capital requirements and explains how they can be converted into a 
common leverage ratio in line with the definitions of the Basel III Accord. Based on this conversion 
we are able to express our results in terms of the Basel III definition of the leverage ratio.    
The estimation of the M-M offset and WACC before any conversion applies the Basel II BIS Tier1 
capital definition as numerator and the banks’ Balance Sheet Asset as denominator of the leverage 
ratio. The estimation of the annual probability of banking crises occurring, and the economic benefit 
before conversion, are estimated using Book Equity as capital definition and Balance Sheet Assets as 
denominator of the leverage ratio.       
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 =  Basel II BIS Tier1  Capital (Cost) resp. Book Equity (Benefit)    
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
In order to compare the results of various definitions of the leverage ratio they must be made 
compatible with a common Basel III basis.  
The new Basel III definition requires that the numerator consists of loss absorbing equity capital, i.e. 
dominantly CET1 and a proportion of AT1. This is a markedly stricter definition than the Basel II BIS 
Tier1 capital definition. In particular, the Basel III definition excludes any hybrid capital items, which 
were found in the financial crisis to be poor in absorbing losses. Also the definition of the 
denominator of the Basel III leverage ratio goes beyond the definition of balance sheet assets. It 
additionally includes off-balance sheet items and treats the calculation of Securities Financing 
Transactions and Derivatives in its own way.33  
In order to convert the different capital and asset definitions to the Basel III standards, we used the 
leverage ratios reported by CS and UBS under both a Basel II and Basel III approach for a common 
reporting period.  
Tables A1.1 to A1.5 present the results. All conversion factors refer in each case to the Look-through 
or Fully applied equity capital definition of Basel III. They capture the equity capital position of the 
banks assuming the full application of Basel III, excluding the phase-in adjustment of the transition 
period from 2014 up to 2018. The conversion factors related to CET1 and Basel II BIS Tier1 
respectively between CET1 and Book Equity are shown in Table A1.1 and A1.2 and were calculated on 
the basis of a common (pre-phasing-in) reporting period from Q4 2011 to Q4 2013.  
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿−𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ = 0.60 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅1  
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿−𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ = 0.52 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 
In the same way we calculated the conversion factors between Basel III Tier1 Look-through and BIS 
Basel II Tier1 respectively Book Equity (see Tables A1.3 and A1.4). The following conversion factors 
were determined:  
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 1𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿−𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ = 0.77 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 1  
𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 1𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿−𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ = 0.73 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑  
Again the calculations are based on the quarterly Financial Reports of CS and UBS. However, for the 
relationship Basel III Tier1 Look-through versus Basel II Tier1 and Book Equity we used the data 
between 2013 Q4 and 2015 Q3 because the banks did not disclose Basel III Tier1 Look-through 
calculations prior to Q4 2013.   
 
                                                                
33 The calculation of the Basel III leverage ratio and in particular its denominator is described in detail in: “Basel 
III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements”, January 2014 and the FINMA Circular 2015/3 
Leverage Ratio”.  
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Finally, we determined the conversion factor between Balance Sheet Assets and the Basel III LRD 
over the period from Q4 2014 to Q3 2015 (Table A1.5). This is the earliest period available where the 
two big banks recorded simultaneously LRD and Balance Sheet Assets. The individual conversion 
factors of the two banks are rather different and reflect to a great deal the differences in the 
accounting standards of the two banks. CS balance sheet calculations follow US-GAAP while the UBS 
calculations are based on IFRS standards. Given the differences in the treatment of derivatives and 
SFTs between US-GAAP and IFRS accounting rules, it is no surprise that the conversion factor of CS is 
considerably larger than the UBS conversion factor.34   
The combined CS and UBS conversion factor is:  
 𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 = 1.08 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
It may be objected that the observation period is too short to calculate reliable conversion factors. 
However, there are reasons to believe that the calculated conversion factors are robust. First, a great 
proportion of on-balance sheet items are treated in the same way across US-GAAP, IFRS and LRD and 
hence, limit the scope for unfounded measurement deviations. Second, thanks to pro-forma LRD 
calculations of UBS back to Q4 2012 we can calculate the conversion factor for this period. It typically 
hovered in a small corridor slightly below 1 with an average conversion factor of 0.98. This suggests 
that the sampled conversion ratios between LRD and the accounting measurements IFRS respectively 
US-GAAP are reliable.    
 
Table A1.1: Conversion Factor: Basel III CET1 Look-through to BIS Basel II Tier1  
 
 
Sources:  
BIS Tier1 Quarterly observations gathered via Bloomberg and Quarterly Financial Reports 
of CS and UBS.  
CET1 Look-through respectively CET1 Fully applied: Quarterly Financial Reports of CS and 
UBS.  
The pro-forma CET1 Look-through figures of CS for Q2 2012 and 2013 and for Q4 2012 
were collected from CS Investor Day Presentations, in particular: Barclays Global Financial 
Services Conference, September 12, 2012 and September 11, 2013. 
 
 
                                                                
34 The quarterly financial reports of CS and UBS in 2015 provide an impression of the different treatments of 
derivatives in SFTs between US accounting rules and IFRS. For example, in case of CS (US-GAAP) leads the 
adjustments of derivatives to LRD to a significant increase of the LRD exposure (CHF 124bn, Q3 2015), and UBS 
(under IFRS) shows a sharp reduction of LRD (CHF 137bn, Q3 2015).  
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Table A1.2: Conversion Factor: Basel III CET1 Look-through to Book Equity 
 
 
Sources:  
Book Equity: Quarterly observations gathered via Bloomberg.   
CET1 Look-through respectively CET1 Fully applied: Quarterly Financial Reports of CS and 
UBS.  
The pro-forma CET1 Look-through figures of CS for Q2 2012 and 2013 and for Q4 2012 
were collected from CS Investor Day Presentations, in particular: Barclays Global Financial 
Services Conference, September 12, 2012 and September 11, 2013. 
 
Table A1.3: Conversion Factor: Basel III Tier1 Look-through to Basel II Tier1 
 
 
Sources:  
BIS Basel II Tier1: Quarterly observations gathered via Bloomberg.  
Basel III Tier1 Look through respectively CET1 Fully applied: Quarterly Financial Reports of CS and 
UBS. 
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Table A1.4: Conversion Factor: Basel III Tier1 Look-through to Book Equity 
 
 
Sources:  
Book Equity: Quarterly observations gathered via Bloomberg.  
Basel III Tier1 Look through respectively CET1 Fully applied: Quarterly Financial Reports of CS and 
UBS. 
 
 
Table A1.3: Conversion Factor: Ratio LRD to Balance Sheet Assets 
 
Sources: 
UBS: Quarterly Reports 2014 and 2015, Section: Capital Management. 
CS: Quarterly Reports 2014 and 2015, Section: Treasury, Risk, Balance Sheet and Off-Balance Sheet. 
 
Annex 2: Estimation of the Translog production function, Switzerland 1995-2014  
The Translog analysis is usually done in the dual framework of cost-share equations. The term dual 
means in this context that all the information needed to obtain the relevant parameters of the 
production function is contained in the corresponding cost function and vice versa. In a model with 
two production factors K and L their corresponding shares in total production costs ( 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾  and 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾  ) are 
represented as linear function of factor prices (𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 and 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ): 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 = 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 log�𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒� + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 log�𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒� + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠                                                                                 (𝑊𝑊2.1) 
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 = 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾 log�𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒� + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 log�𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒� + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠                                                                                     (𝑊𝑊2.2) 
 
29 
 
For theoretical reasons the 𝛾𝛾 – matrix is symmetric (𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 = 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾) as substitution of capital by labour is 
symmetric. As the left-hand variables are shares the slope coefficients add up to zero (𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 =0; 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0; 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 = 0), whereas the intercepts add up to 1 (𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 + 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿 = 1). Given these 
restrictions, we only have to estimate one equation. Using the restriction 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 = −𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿  we can write 
the first equation of the system above as: 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒 = 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(log�𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒� − log�𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒�) + 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠                                                                                   (𝑊𝑊2.3) 
Note that this model collapses to the Cobb Douglas case if both 𝛾𝛾 coefficients are zero and we arrive 
at a constant cost share of capital which is independent of factor price and equal to the intercept 
term 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾. Correspondingly the labour cost share is constant and equal to 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿 = 1 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 . If the elasticity 
of substitution is below 1 then we have a positive 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  coefficient and if technical progress is biased 
in favour of capital 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 is positive. 
The elasticity of substitution is calculated as  
𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒  = 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 + 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 = −𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 + 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒                                                                                              (𝑊𝑊2.4) 
which is, of course, 1 for the Cobb Douglas function.  As we can see from the equation above the 
opposite case of a zero elasticity of substitution implies a maximum positive parameter value of 
𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  =  𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿. 
Figure 6 and 7 display the data used in our estimation. Figure 6 shows the development of the cost 
share of capital defined as net operating surplus + depreciation (or capital consumption) divided by 
the sum of capital costs and compensation of employees (labour costs).  The factor prices were 
calculated by dividing capital income by the capital stock and total labour income by the number of 
hours worked. 
The estimation results for the capital share equation (𝑊𝑊2.3) are given in Table A2.1. In order to avoid 
simultaneity problems we estimated the model with a lag of one for factor prices. 
 
Figure 6: Cost share of capital, Switzerland 1995-2014. 
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Data source:  Capital and Labour income, employment and hours worked, 
https://data.snb.ch/de/topics/uvo#!/cu.  
Capital stock, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/volkswirtschaft/kapitalstock.html 
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Table A2.1: Estimation results for the Translog production function, Switzerland 1995-2014 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Parameter Estimate Restricted estimate 
𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 0.1028 (0.04217) 0.1371 (0.03618) 
𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 -0.000554 (0.000513) __ Adj. R2 0.3557 0.3637 S.E 0.01084 0.01077 Durbin Watson 1.2435 1.3461 
 
Table A2.1 shows a positive 𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾-estimate which is statistically significantly different from zero and 
implies a substitution elasticity which is clearly lower than one in absolute value. However, no 
evidence in favour of a non-neutral technical progress is found, while the deterministic trend 
coefficient is small and statistically not different from zero. Therefore, we estimated the model 
without time trend which gives a slightly higher  𝛾𝛾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾-estimate in absolute value. Inserting the time 
varying factor shares displayed in Figure 6 results in an elasticity of substitution estimate varying 
between 0.42 and 0.44 during the period 1995-2014. Given this time series of the capital cost share 
(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) and the elasticity of substitution (𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒 ) we are able to calculate a time-varying estimate for 
the elasticity of production with respect to the price of capital as given in equation (9). It varies 
between -0.34 to -0.27 with a mean and median approximately equal to -0.31. As shown in Figure 7, 
the elasticity of output with respect to price of capital reached its absolute maximum before the 
financial crisis and decreases in absolute value since 2008 implying a weaker reaction of GDP to 
capital costs changes in recent years.   
Figure 7: Translog estimate of the elasticity of GDP to the price of capital, Switzerland 1995-2014. 
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Annex 3: Parameter values for calculation of the optimal leverage ratios  
 
Table A3.1 and A3.2 list the parameters and the values used in the calculation of the optimal leverage 
ratio for Basel III Tier1 and CET1 capital. Table A3.1 shows alternative values for key variables next to 
the parameter values of the base case.      
Table: A3.1: Base case parameter values and alternatives 
Parameter Description Base Case Low opt. 
LR 
High opt. 
LR 
M-M 
offset: 𝒂𝒂� 
Intercept of â of the M-M regression. If â = 1 
there is no M-M offset, if â = 0 M-M holds 
fully       
0.826987 1 0.5059 
𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 Equity Risk Premium 5% / 10% 10% 5% 
SEF Share of non-financial corporates' financing 
provided by G-SIBs 
10.8% 18.5% 10.8% 
𝑬𝑬𝒀𝒀,𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷  Elasticity of production with respect to the 
price of capital 
0.31 0.34 0.27 
A Constant of GDP benefit curve and varies 
with GDP losses of 17.7% (base case), 10% 
(low LR*) and 28.5% (high LR*) 
1.56E-04 8.81E-05 2.51E-04 
𝝆𝝆 Exponent of GDP benefit curve 2.541 2.463 2.619 
Explanation of the alternative parameter values: 
- M-M offset variation of â = 1 (no M-M), â - 2 standard errors 0.5059 (M-M offset is 67%) 
- Risk Premium: lower (5%) bound and upper (10%) bound to take care of the variations of 
equity risk premiums     
- SEF: The lower bound of SEF (10.8 percent) is the share of G-SIBs in external financing of the 
Swiss corporate sector. The upper bound includes in addition the Swiss D-SIBs Raiffeisenbank 
and ZKB.35 The market share of Raiffeisenbank in Swiss domestic credits is 13.5 percent36 for 
period 2012 to 2015 and that of ZKB is 8 percent.37 These shares must be multiplied with the 
share of external financing of the corporate sector (35 percent) and added to 10.8 percent in 
order determine the upper bound of SEF of 18.5 percent.    
- Production elasticity with respect to the price of capital: The estimations of the Translog 
framework showed that the elasticity varies between 0.27 and 0.34 with a mean and median 
of 0.31.       
- A is the constant of the benefit curve and defined as crises probability * GDP Loss. The base 
case GDP Loss (17.7 percent of GDP) and the upper GDP Loss (28.5 percent of GDP) are 
derived from our historical regression analysis (equation 18). The lower GDP Loss of 10% is 
the ratio of the bank losses of CS and UBS (nearly CHF 60 bn.) to GDP in the financial crisis 
from 2007/8.         
                                                                
35 The PostFinance, also a D-SIB, is not allowed to provide credits. 
36 See SNB Statistik: Bankenstatistisches Monatsheft, Kreditvolumenstatistik.    
37 See ZKB: https://www.zkb.ch/media/dok/corporate/medien/praesentation-rudolf-sigg.pdf 
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- Exponent 𝜌𝜌: estimate +/- 2 standard errors, 2.463 and 2.619 
  
Table: A3.1: Other parameters used to calculate GDP cost and benefit  
Parameter  Description Value 
𝑹𝑹𝒇𝒇 Risk-free money market rate   1% 
𝒃𝒃� Slope coefficient of M-M regression (2001Q2-2015Q2) 0.01754 
𝜷𝜷𝒕𝒕
𝑪𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒑𝒑 Swiss corporate companies 1.1 
Tier1, 𝑪𝑪𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒏 Leverage Ratio: Basel III Tier1 Look-through to Basel II Tier1   0.713 
Tier1, 𝑩𝑩𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒏 Leverage Ratio: Basel III Tier1 Look-through to Book Equity  0.676 
CET1, 𝑪𝑪𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒏 Leverage Ratio: Basel III CET1 Look-through to Basel II Tier1   0.556 
CET1, 𝑩𝑩𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒏 Leverage Ratio: Basel III CET1 Look-through to Book Equity 0.481 
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